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‘As soon as these questions were squarely faced, a wide 
range of new phenomena were discovered, including 
quite simple ones that had passed unnoticed.’ 




It is a commonplace that statements of pure mathematics are necessarily true if true at all. But 
why should we think this? A cursory investigation of the practice of mathematics itself presents 
something of a puzzle here. Mathematicians do not appear to make use of the language of 
metaphysical necessity and possibility in their own investigations. Of course they do use the 
modal words ‘might’ and ‘must’ and their cognates. However, their use of these words does 
not provide much evidence that metaphysical modality is in play in any serious way. On the 
one hand, many of their uses seem to be metaphorical. As Wilfrid Hodges points out, when a 
mathematician says, for example, that one system ‘can be embedded’ in another, this is little 
more than a colorful way of saying that there is an embedding of one into the other. What the 
modal ‘can’ adds is  
 
a certain human colouring, by suggesting that part of the mathematics is carried out by a 
human being. This adds nothing to the mathematical content, but somehow it helps the 
readability (Hodges 2013: 6). 
 
On the other hand, many uses of modals in mathematics express epistemic modality. For 
example, when mathematicians say at some point in their investigations, ‘Various answers 
might be correct’, they are not giving voice to a perceived metaphysical contingency in 
mathematical reality, but signaling that which answer is correct is an open question at the 
relevant stage in the process of mathematical discovery. And similarly, when they say, ‘Only 
one answer can be correct’, they are talking about what has been established at the relevant 
stage, not about what is and is not metaphysically necessary: if it turns out that two answers 
are epistemically live at the time of speaking or writing, then the ‘can’ claim will be reckoned 
false. Also similarly, when a mathematician says that ‘Given that A, it must be that B’, arguably 
the ‘must’ again expresses a kind of epistemic modality.2 (One of us has explored elsewhere 
                                               
1 This is also the epigraph to Hodges (2013). We did not, however, choose it as an allusion to that paper, but 
simply because we could think of no better epigraph for our own paper. 
2 We will not defend this take over Hodges’ own gloss on these ‘must’s as ‘formatting to guide the reader through 
the structure of the reasoning’ (Hodges 2007: 12).  
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the behavior of epistemic modals embedded in logically complex sentences.3) And it is far 
from clear that there is any modality left once we set aside the metaphorical and epistemic uses 
of modals in mathematical texts.4 Prima facie, then, it seems that mathematical practice is 
silent on the question of the status of mathematical truths vis-à-vis metaphysical modality. 
It is tempting to take these observations to support the view that the doctrine that 
mathematics is necessary is something that has been added by philosophers to the body of 
knowledge provided by mathematics itself, which can proceed just fine without taking on any 
metaphysically modal commitments. This view has prominent defenders. For example, in 
‘Modality in Mathematics’ Wilfrid Hodges tells us: 
 
Mathematicians are pleased to know that 
 







The fact that these statements are necessarily true might attract the attention of a philosopher 
of mathematics, and some mathematicians dream about such things in idle moments. But 
adding ‘Necessarily’ to either (1) or (2) would introduce nothing of any mathematical 
significance (Hodges 2013: 1–2). 
 
Hodges begins another paper, ‘Necessity in Mathematics’, by prominently displaying the 
following ‘fact’: 
 




                                               
3 See Dorr and Hawthorne (2013). 
4 As Timothy Williamson pointed out in conversation, Church’s thesis, which asserts the equivalence of the 
intuitive notion of computability with the formal ones, is an interesting test case here. The key issue is whether 
the modality expressed by the suffix ‘-able’ in ‘computable’, in its intuitive sense, is some kind of objective 
modality (in the sense of Williamson 2017a). (There are various inequivalent glosses on the intuitive notion. 
Turing [1939: 8], for example, says he will ‘use the expression ‘computable function’ to mean a function 
calculable by a machine’. Another kind of gloss, common in textbooks, speaks of computability by a human or 
some other kind of agent. For example, Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey [2007: 23] say that a function is computable 
iff ‘there are definite, explicit rules by following which one could in principle compute its value for any given 
argument’.) Certainly the modality in play is not epistemic, but is it metaphysical or otherwise objective? One 
reason for being cautious here is that mathematicians tend to make free use of Church’s thesis without ever 
worrying about whether it is objectively possible to build a certain kind of machine or for a human or other agent 
to perform certain kinds of tasks. (Hence the frequently occurring weasel words ‘in principle’. More things may 
be ‘in principle possible’ than are possible simpliciter. ‘In principle’ does not appear to be factive.) This suggests 
to us that the mathematicians’ intuitive notion of ‘computable’ might be similar to their intuitive notion of 
‘provable’, in that what makes something computable in the relevant sense is simply that there is a certain kind 
of procedure for computing it, and this is unrelated to the difficult question of whether it is objectively possible 
for anything to implement that procedure. In his comments on a draft of this paper, Williamson responded to this 
last suggestion by pointing out that ‘the claim that there is a mechanical procedure for computing f may itself be 
derived from the judgment that a proper specification of such a procedure could be constructed in line with some 
impressionistic sketch provided’. We will leave further exploration of these issues to others. 
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But only philosophers are interested in the fact that this theorem is necessarily true. 
Mathematicians are content if they can show that it is true (ibid.). 
 
 Having gotten this far, one might think that, insofar as we are justified in thinking that 
mathematics is necessary at all, such justification will proceed not from the practices of 
mathematicians but from the practices of armchair philosophers. Stories about how such 
practices confer justification or knowledge are many and varied. Most crudely, one might posit 
cognitive phenomenology that forcefully presents the necessity of certain propositions, 
including those of pure mathematics.5 On the heels of this picture, one might tack on the 
epistemological principle, popular in some circles, that one is ‘prima facie justified’ in 
believing any proposition of which one has an ‘intuition’ or an ‘intellectual seeming’. And one 
might then hope to run the gauntlet of candidate ‘defeaters’ in order to emerge with justification 
simpliciter. Alternatively, one might take a conventionalist approach. Perhaps, one might think, 
there is no ‘joint in reality’ that is picked out by the idioms of metaphysical modality, and the 
truths of mathematics get to be necessary simply on account of our having decided in a quasi-
stipulative way that they belong to a special ‘list’. 6  Or alternatively, and perhaps most 
intriguingly, one might claim that mathematics is necessary on the basis of its purported 
reducibility to logic in combination with the necessity of logic itself. This is the so-called (neo-
)logicist program adapted to the role of proving the necessity of mathematics.7 (The other main 
approaches to the foundations of mathematics—intuitionism and formalism—are less 
obviously well-equipped to provide any compelling story about the necessity of mathematics.) 
The picture-thinking is clear enough: since it is not that mysterious that logic is necessary, by 
reducing mathematics to logic we also render the necessity of the mathematics unmysterious.8 
For what it’s worth, we find the neologicist approach to our question more promising 
than the other two mentioned in the previous paragraph.9 (And we are not alone. When we 
asked a variety of philosophers why they thought we should think that mathematics is 
necessary, some variant of ‘logicism’ was by far the most common answer.) Here is how that 
approach would work. Neologicists maintain that some decent-sized axiomatizable 
mathematical theory—typically, the fragment of arithmetic characterized by the Peano 
axioms—is reducible to logic on account of its axioms being derivable from an abstraction 
                                               
5 See Bealer (2002). 
6 See Sider (2011: ch. 12). 
7 See Hale and Wright (2001). 
8 Yet another route to the necessity of mathematics, in some non-epistemic sense of ‘necessity’, goes via modal 
interpretations of mathematical language, such as Putnam (1967) and Hellman’s (1993) modal structuralism, 
and Fine (2006), Linnebo (2010), and Studd’s (2013) account of ‘indefinite extensibility’ phenomena. It is 
unclear, however, how the modalities these authors discuss are related to metaphysical modality. 
9 Just as this paper was about to go to press, Hannes Leitgeb shared with us his intriguing argument for the 
necessity of mathematics (Leitgeb 2018). His idea is that the necessity of all truths of pure mathematics can be 
derived from the rigidity of set membership (which we accept) together with the putative fact that all statements 
of pure mathematics can be ‘reformulated’ in the language of set theory (this is the thesis of ‘set-theoretic 
foundationalism’, which we find less obvious). Although we prefer our own approach, we note that Leitgeb’s 
approach shares one advantage with ours over the alternatives: as he points out, ‘at least some form of set-
theoretic foundationalism is widely presupposed in contemporary mathematics’ (§1). Thus, like us, he is trying 
to justify the thesis of the necessity of mathematics (at least in part) using materials found within mathematics 
itself. 
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principle in some axiomatic system of second-order logic. By supplementing their favorite 
system of second-order logic with the ‘necessitation’ rule  
 
   A  
£A, 
 
which ensures that £A is a theorem whenever A is, and the standard K axiom  
 
£(A ® B) ® (£A ® £B), 
 
they will obtain a system S that can be shown to be sound (but not complete) on a natural 
generalization of standard possible worlds semantics for modal logic to the second-order 
case.10 Then, for any theorem T of the mathematical theory whose axioms are provable from 
the abstraction principle a in the original system of non-modal second-order logic, £a ® £T 
will be a theorem of S. Thus, given that the abstraction principle is necessary, and given that 
the system is (informally) sound, it follows that each theorem of the reduced mathematical 
theory is also necessary. 
Yet an appeal to neologicism as a general answer to our question still does not seem 
very promising. We have no objection to the use of the necessitation rule, which enables the 
neologicists to prove the necessity of all of the truths of second-order logic they have 
axiomatized. It will be widely accepted that assuming logic to be necessary is an acceptable 
starting point.11 Yet, even granting the necessity of logic, the neologicist strategy has certain 
inherent limitations. It can, at best, establish only the necessity of those mathematical truths 
that are provable in whatever axiomatic system it uses. By Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem, we know that these cannot even include all truths of first-order arithmetic. (That result 
was, after all, the downfall of the original logicist program of Frege and Russell; hence the 
prefix ‘neo’. Neologicists are content to reduce some but not all of mathematics to logic.) We 
also have two more general philosophical qualms about the approach. First, neologicists cannot 
even establish the necessity of the axiomatizable fragments of mathematics they target unless 
they can establish the necessity of the abstraction principles they assume. But, insofar as there 
is any neologicist story about why the abstraction principles are necessary, it tends to proceed 
via the claim that they are ‘analytic’ or that they are ‘conceptual truths’—ideology that we find 
problematic for broadly Williamsonian reasons.12,13 Second, many neologicists seem to be 
motivated by a commitment to the view that logic is in some sense metaphysically neutral or 
innocent (since they often write as if a reduction to logic would purge mathematics of 
metaphysical tendentiousness).14 But logic isn’t metaphysically neutral.15 What makes logic 
logic is not its neutrality but its generality. If one wants to play it safe from an ontological point 
                                               
10  For example, Gallin’s (1975) semantics for the system MLP will do: see Williamson (2013a: §5.5) for 
discussion. 
11 See, however, Clarke-Doane (2017) for a notable exception. 
12 See Williamson (2007: chs. 3–4). 
13 A particularly radical and technically untaxing form of the view that all truths of mathematics follow by logic 
from analytic truths is the view that all truths of mathematics are analytic. Timothy Williamson gestured at this 
view in conversation, and pointed out that at least it bypasses worries concerning truths of mathematics that are 
not provable from standard axioms. (Of course, as an analyticity-skeptic, Williamson himself does not endorse 
any version of the view that mathematics is analytic.) A proponent of this view cannot think of analytic truths as 
truths that one immediately assents to upon understanding them, but arguably even ordinary neologicists have to 
distance themselves from any such conception of analyticity. 
14 Hale and Wright are our paradigms. See the Introduction to Hale and Wright (2001), and see Raatikainen 
(forthcoming) for discussion. 
15 See Williamson (2013b). 
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of view, sticking to logic as the foundation of both (some) mathematics and the source of its 
necessity is not a good game plan. Of course we don’t expect these brief remarks to convince 
die-hard neologicists, but we put them forward in the hope that they will clue the reader into 
our own orientation in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. The original contribution of 
this paper is the alternative picture it develops and not its critique of extant accounts of the 
necessity of mathematics. 
 In our view, the supposition that mathematics is silent on questions of metaphysical 
modality is completely wrong-headed. Hodges’ claim that mathematics does not directly 
deploy idioms of metaphysical necessity and possibility is certainly plausible. However, we 
will argue, mathematics makes use of the counterfactual conditional, which in both ordinary 
and mathematical English is paradigmatically expressed by the subjunctive conditional 
construction 
 
If . . . (then) - - - would _ _ _.16 
 
The use of counterfactual conditionals is by no means a marginal feature of mathematical 
discourse. (We will later explain why it is not dispensable.) In fact, we will argue, the pattern 
of their deployment encodes a commitment to the necessity of all mathematical truths. These 
aspects of mathematical practice put the thesis of the necessity of mathematics on a firmer 
footing: if our story is correct, then challenging that thesis requires challenging the practice of 
mathematics itself. 
Some foundational questions will remain open even if we are right. Grounding-lovers 
will still wish to inquire after what grounds the necessity of mathematics. We will not undertake 
to defend the claim that the necessity of mathematics is grounded in counterfactual facts. And 
epistemologists may wish to inquire after how mathematicians are justified in thinking and 
saying the things that, we argue, commit them to the necessity of mathematics. We will not 
address these further questions. Our ambitions are more modest.  
 In §1 we introduce our assumptions about the language of mathematics. In §2 we argue 
that mathematical practice is committed to the necessity of all mathematical truths in virtue of 
its commitment to the acceptability of a certain inference pattern involving counterfactuals. In 
§3 we argue that the modal commitments of mathematics extend even further than we found 
in §2: mathematics, it turns out, is committed to all theorems of the modal system S5 that are 
expressible in mathematical language—S5 being the system that is widely thought to capture 
the logic of metaphysical modality. In §4 we anticipate and respond to four objections. 
 
1. The language of mathematics  
 
By the ‘language of mathematics’ we mean the language of pure (i.e., not applied) mathematics 
that one finds in textbooks and professional journals. In what follows we are going to make 
some fairly modest assumptions about the logical constants that are present in that language. 
First, we will assume that the language has at least the standard truth-functional connectives, 
including ^. (^ is the 0-place connective—i.e., sentence constant—that is a truth-functional 
contradiction.) Second, we assume that the language has the counterfactual conditional 
connective £®.  
Admittedly, our assumption about the presence of the standard truth-functional 
connectives in the language of mathematics is a little idealized. For example, the use of a 
primitive contradiction symbol is far from a pervasive feature of mathematical texts. Yet the 
                                               
16 Arguably the distinctive hallmark in English is the occurrence in the antecedent of the conditional of ‘fake past 
tense’, a layer of tense that has nothing to do with temporal past. See Iatridou (2000). 
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idealization is harmless enough. For example, one could define ^ as an abbreviation for some 
paradigmatic truth-functional contradiction. 17 
Similarly, while the language of mathematics doesn’t contain a single expression with 
the logical type and meaning of £®, it does contain the resources for expressing everything 
that can be expressed by £®. Mathematics is rife with counterfactual conditionals, although 
these are often not in the standard form ‘If … (then) - - - would _ _ _’. For example, in the 
canonical contemporary text on mathematical logic, we encounter the following sentence early 
on: 
 
Suppose there were a machine computing t. It would have some number k of states (Boolos, 
Burgess, and Jeffrey 2007: 41).18 
 
A casual survey of indirect proofs in virtually any classic mathematical text yields many more 
examples. To pick an example virtually at random, here is one from a classic text on 
computability: 
 
THEOREM 6.1. The set of all Gödel numbers of Turing machines Z, for which YZ(x) is 
total, is not recursively enumerable. 
 PROOF. Let us designate the set of all such Gödel numbers by R, and let us suppose that 
R is recursively enumerable. Then, since R ≠ Æ, there would be a recursive function f(n) whose 
range is R. 
 The function U(miny T(f(n), x, y)) would be total, and hence recursive. Hence U(miny 
T(f(n), x, y)) + 1 would be recursive. Hence, by the very definition of f(n), there would be a number 
n0 such that 
 
U(miny T(f(n), x, y)) + 1 = U(miny T(f(n0), x, y)). 
 
Setting x = n0 yields a contradiction (Davis 1958: Ch. 5, p 78). 
 
Here are a few more examples lest the reader suspects that we have confined our search to 
mathematical logic and computability theory: 
 
B transforms the s = B:Np Sylow p-groups conjugate to B under G among themselves, and as 
above it follows that s º 1 (p). If there were another system of conjugate Sylow p-groups, then its 
members would be transformed into each other by B in systems of transitivity whose degree would 
be divisible by p. The system would therefore contain a number s1, divisible by p, of Sylow p-
groups; on the other hand we conclude for s1, just as we did for s, that s1 º 1 (p) (Zassenhaus 1958: 
§IV.1). 
 
Conversely, assume that every Cauchy sequence in S has its limit in S. If S were not closed then 
its complement would not be open. Hence there would be a point t Î ℝ	\ S with the property that 
no interval (t–e,t+e) lies in ℝ	\ S. (Krantz 2016: §4.1). 
 
Clearly, S is subanalytic; if S were semianalytic, then there would be some real analytic function 
f(x, y, z) defined near (0, 0, 0), not identical to zero, which vanishes on S (Krantz and Parks 2002: 
181). 
 
We assume that the common construction ‘Suppose … . (Then) - - - would _ _ _’ is 
simply a reader-friendly way of expressing a counterfactual conditional. Mathematical writing 
                                               
17 We note in passing that ‘0 = 1’ is standardly used as the falsum in intuitionistic mathematics. 
18  Kratzer’s (1986) analysis of this discourse would make ‘would’ a restricted modal operator, where the 
restriction is supplied by the preceding sentence together with the ‘modal base’ supplied by the context of speech. 
We find her treatment of the underlying logical forms of natural language counterfactuals plausible, but we are 
not going to rely on it. 
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often splits conditionals, both subjunctive and indicative, into two or more sentences, which 
makes it easier to parse conditionals with logically complex consequents and antecedents. 
(‘Suppose A. Then B’ is a standard way of stating a theorem. The theorem so stated is just this: 
if A then B.) One also often encounters in mathematical texts sentences whose main verb is 
‘would’ with no relevant ‘suppose’ preceding it. In such cases, at least typically, there is either 
a preceding sentence that is meant to be understood as the antecedent of a counterfactual or 
some preceding sentences whose conjunction is meant to be so understood. 
 We take it that our assumptions about the language of mathematics are not especially 
tendentious. What has been overlooked in discussions of the modal status of mathematics is 
that these assumptions entail that that language has the resources for asserting the necessity of 
every proposition expressible in it. After all, the following definition of the metaphysical 
necessity operator £ falls out of both of the two standard semantics for counterfactuals 
(Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973). 
 
Definition 1.  £A  =df  ¬A £® ^ 
 
While the semantics of Lewis and Stalnaker provide a powerful motivation for 
Definition 1, a perhaps even more powerful motivation for it is supplied by a proof-theoretic 
observation due to Timothy Williamson. Williamson (2007: 155-58) observes that the material 
equivalence of the two sides of Definition 1 is derivable from the following two principles in 
an extremely weak modal logic. 
 
NECESSITY:  £(A ® B) ® (A £®  B) 
 
POSSIBILITY:  (A £®  B) ® (¯A ® ¯B) 
 
These principles are pretty compelling. NECESSITY says that strict implication implies 
counterfactual implication—or, in other words, that, whenever it is necessary that if A then B, 
it is also the case that, if it had been the case that A, then it would have been the case that B. 
Or, equivalently, using the suppositional idiom: 
 
Suppose that it is necessary that if A then B. Then, if it had been the case that A, it would 
have been the case that B. 
 
POSSIBILITY says that anything counterfactually implied by a possible proposition is also 
possible—or, equivalently, in suppositional language: 
 
Suppose that if it were the case that A then it would be the case that B. Then it is possible 
that B only if it is possible that A. 
 
The derivation of £A « (¬A £® ^) from NECESSITY and POSSIBILITY requires nothing more 
than the weakest normal modal logic K. Given the validity of both NECESSITY and POSSIBILITY 
and the soundness of K, it follows that £A and (¬A £® ^) are logically equivalent, wherefore 
we may treat the former as an abbreviation for the latter, as we do in Definition 1. 
 With NECESSITY and POSSIBILITY in place, the language of mathematics can thus be 
used to assert the necessity of any proposition it can express. (In §4, we will consider the status 
of each of NECESSITY and POSSIBILITY in more detail.) But it remains to be argued that 
mathematical practice is committed to the necessity of all mathematical truths. That is the task 
of the next two sections. 
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2. The necessity of mathematics 
 
In this section we will argue that mathematics is committed to the necessity of every 
mathematical truth, in the sense that it is provable in mathematics that every mathematical 
statement is necessarily true if true. The notion of provability that we are working with is what 
philosophers of mathematics call ‘informal provability’ (or ‘absolute provability’), 19  as 
opposed to the system-relative notion of ‘formal provability’, or provability in a given formal 
system. The basic idea is that a statement is informally provable just in case there is a proof of 
it in the sense of ‘proof’ operative in actual mathematical practice, as opposed to philosophers’ 
formalizations of mathematical theories. We will use the symbol ‘⊢’ to express the relation of 
informal provability. Thus ‘G ⊢ A’ says that A is informally provable from the set G of 
statements; ‘⊢ A’ abbreviates ‘Æ ⊢ A’ and says that A is informally provable from the empty 
set, i.e., informally provable simpliciter. Below we omit the set brackets, writing, e.g., ‘A1, …, 
An ⊢ B’ instead of ‘{A1, …, An} ⊢ B’. 
Two features of informal provability are important for our discussion. First, informal 
provability differs from formal provability in that it always preserves truth. As a special case, 
a statement that is informally provable simpliciter is true. In contrast, there are formal 
systems—ones with false axioms or unsound rules of inference—in which provability does not 
preserve truth or in which falsehoods are provable. (The system of Frege’s Grundgesetze der 
Arithmetik, in which everything turned out to be provable, is a famous example.) Second, the 
informal provability of B from A1, …, An does not imply that B is a logical consequence of A1, 
…, An. As a special case, the informal provability of A does not imply that A is a logical truth. 
(Of course, a neologicist may wish to claim that the informal provability of B from A1, …, An 
implies that B is a logical consequence of A1, …, An together with some analytic or conceptual 
truths.) An informal proof of a mathematical truth B typically consists in a logically valid 
argument for B from some assumptions A1, …, An, each of which is informally provable. When 
such a proof is given, we say that ⊢ B, and not merely that A1, …, An ⊢ B. Indeed, the mere 
existence of such a proof, whether or not anyone ever actually gives it, implies that ⊢ B.20 In 
what follows, we will for the most part use the word ‘provability’ and its cognates for informal 
provability and related notions, since no other varieties of provability will be at issue.21 
The notion of informal provability is unclear in various ways that we’ll leave for others 
to sort out. An especially serious source of unclarity is the relationship between our capacity 
to know certain mathematical truths and their informal provability. According to one 
perspective, we can know facts of pure mathematics that are not provable from its axioms, and 
                                               
19 See Gödel (1951) and Myhill (1960) for the classic discussions, and Leitgeb (2009) and Williamson (2016a) 
for two recent ones. 
20 Of course, ‘provability’ sounds modal, and one might wonder what kind of modality is in play. Related 
questions arise for such locutions as ‘provable in principle’ or ‘possible in principle to prove’. The issues here 
are similar to those that arise in note 4. We will not assume any particular modal gloss or even take a stand on 
whether the modal idiom as used in this context is a throw-away. 
21 The referee was concerned that this notion of provability seems very different from the one operative in 
mathematics. One natural source of concern is the thought that mathematicians wouldn’t apply ‘provable’ to 
their axioms. We are not inclined to take this as decisive evidence that their notion is different. Granted, 
mathematicians may routinely deny that any axiom is provable. However, it is not obvious how willing they 
would be, upon careful reflection, to give up the principle that anything provable from the axioms (which 
includes, obviously, the axioms themselves) is provable. Relatedly, we are highly confident that mathematicians 
would, on reflection want to say that anything provable from something provable is itself provable (this is a 
special case of Cut: see below). But if they say this and they allow conjunctions of axioms and theorems to be 
provable (or conjunctions of axioms to be), then they must also count axioms as provable. The reader who 
suspects that we are deploying a notion of provability different from that found in mathematical practice should 
read our ‘⊢ A’ as ‘A is either an axiom or is provable from the axioms’, where ‘axiom’ and ‘provable’ mean 
whatever they mean as used by classical mathematicians. 
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so knowledge of a mathematical fact doesn’t entail its provability. For example, if we know 
that ZFC is true, we also know that it is consistent, but the consistency of ZFC is not provable 
from any established axioms. According to another perspective, there is nothing 
epistemologically deep about the label ‘axiom’, and the best regimentation of informal 
provability is along the lines of ‘there is a proof of A from mathematical premises that can be 
known’.22 The latter tack is arguably a bit revisionary, but we’re not going to take a position 
on it here. Another tack would be to say that both ‘informal provability’ and ‘axiom’ are 
context-dependent, with ‘axiom’ applying in each context to the truths of mathematics that the 
contextually relevant community of mathematicians treats as axioms. Fortunately, the 
structural principles of informal provability that will be assumed in our arguments do not 
depend on these issues, and so we will not pursue them further.23 
We will now argue that mathematics is committed to the necessity of all mathematical 
truths. To establish this, we need only make some fairly modest assumptions about provability. 
First, we will assume that provability is classical in the following sense. 
 
CLASSICALITY. (i) (Classical Consequence) G ⊢ A whenever A follows from G by classical 
logic. 
 
(ii) (Deduction Theorem) If G, A ⊢ B, then G ⊢ A ® B. 
 
(iii) (Modus Ponens) G, A Þ B, A ⊢ B, where Þ  is any conditional. 
 
(iv) (Cut) If G ⊢ A1, …, An and P, A1, …, An ⊢ B, then G, P ⊢ B. 
 
In fact, we are making a stronger assumption than we need for our argument for 
mathematics’ commitment to its own necessity: it will only use clauses (i) and (ii) of 
CLASSICALITY. (iii) and (iv) will only be used in the discussion of S5 in §3. 
We are aware, of course, that some mathematicians, operating within an intuitionistic 
framework, are explicitly committed to denying CLASSICALITY(i) (but not (ii), (iii), or (iv)). 
But it is classical mathematics that concerns us here, and we will not be discussing which of 
our results carry over to an intuitionistic setting. 




If G, A ⊢ B, then G ⊢ A £ ® B. 
                                               
22 See Williamson (2016a) for discussion. 
23 Another tricky issue that we’ll leave for others to sort out concerns self-referential sentences. If the diagonal 
lemma holds for informal provability, as it perhaps will if we express informal provability, as we have, by a 
metalinguistic predicate, we face some difficult decisions: a rich enough theory that includes, for some predicate 
P, all instances of P(⌜A⌝) ® A and is closed under the rule  
     A  
P(⌜A⌝) 
is inconsistent. (See Löb 1955 and Myhill 1960: 463; see Montague 1963 for more general results.) ⊢ had better 
not be such a predicate in our theory of informal provability, then. The simplest solution here is to follow 
Montague’s suggestion along with the tradition of provability logic going back to the ur-text (Gödel 1933) and 
not express informal provability by a metalinguistic predicate, opting for an ‘it is provable that’ operator instead, 
but this is awkward because the bearers of provability are more naturally thought of as sentences (as in Myhill 
1960) than their contents. Those who prefer the predicate approach may wish to adapt Tarski’s approach to the 
liar paradox by introducing a hierarchy of provability predicates, or they may deny that ⊢ belongs to the 
language of mathematics at all, or reject the rule A/⊢	⌜A⌝, among other options. 
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To argue for COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION we cannot argue that it is a principle of 
logic, because it isn’t. (The principle does not hold when ‘⊢’ is interpreted as expressing 
provability in any standard system of counterfactual logic.) Rather, to argue for 
COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION we must argue that mathematical practice displays a 
commitment to it. But there is plenty of evidence of such a commitment. In mathematics it is 
commonplace, having supposed An, in addition to any assumptions A1, …, An – 1 one has 
previously made, to conclude that B would be true (if An were true) on the basis of a recognition 
that B is provable from A1, …, An. In such cases, the antecedent of the counterfactual is often 
left implicit. Consider this example from the passage we already quoted in Davis’s 
Computability and Unsolvability: 
 
Let us designate the set of all such Gödel numbers by R, and let us suppose that R is recursively 
enumerable. Then, since R ≠ Æ, there would exist a recursive function f(n) whose range is R. (Davis 
1958: Ch. 5, p. 78). 
 
Here Davis supposes that a certain set R is recursively enumerable, recognizes that the 
existence of a recursive function whose range is R is provable from that supposition and his 
earlier assumptions, and concludes that there would be such a function. The implicit antecedent 
is that R is recursively enumerable. 
 Moreover, the practice of using counterfactuals in proofs by reductio is hard to make 
sense of without attributing a commitment to COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION to 
mathematicians. Consider, for example, the standard (Euclid-inspired) style of reductio of the 
hypothesis that there is a largest prime number.24 It is natural to put this in counterfactual terms, 
and indeed it is often put that way both in informal presentations and in textbooks: One begins 
by supposing that there is a largest prime number, and one deduces further claims from that 
claim along with certain established truths, eventually concluding that, if there were a largest 
prime number, then the successor of the product of all of the primes would be both prime and 
composite (and thus not prime). The reasoning cannot easily be reconstructed without fitting it 
into the mould of COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION, so that G is the set of the established axioms 
of number theory, A is the hypothesis that there is a largest prime, and B the claim that the 
successor of the product of all of the primes would be both prime and composite. 
 Of course, like any complex social practice, the practice of mathematical proof and 
exposition is not completely uniform, and we can find within it some sub-practices that, when 
considered in isolation, will seem incompatible with a commitment to COUNTERFACTUAL 
DEDUCTION. However, we think that those sub-practices are both sufficiently marginal and 
sufficiently easy to explain by appeal to general conditional heuristics that, on balance, they do 
not justify withdrawing the attribution of a commitment to COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION to 
mathematical practice: we will discuss this issue further in §4.4. 
 Here is our argument. First, by Classical Consequence, 
 
A, ¬A ⊢ ^. 
 
By COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION, then 
 
A ⊢ ¬A £® ^, 
 
which, by Definition 1, is none other than 
                                               




 A ⊢ £A. 
 
By the Deduction Theorem, then  
 
(£) ⊢	A ® £A.  
 
(£) implies that all mathematical truths are necessarily true if true, so it implies that all 
mathematical truths are necessary. But (£) says something even stronger than that: it says that 
it is provable that all mathematical truths are necessary. (Because provability implies truth, the 
provability of the necessity of all mathematical truths implies the necessity of all mathematical 
truths.) 
 It is significant that our conclusion is that ⊢	A ® £A and not merely that A ® £A. 
The conclusion is that mathematics is committed to the necessity of its truths in the precise 
sense that the necessity of mathematical truths is itself provable in mathematics. There is no 
epistemic division of labor, then. Philosophers may still wish to debate the modal status of 
mathematical statements, but in doing so they are calling into question a commitment of 
mathematics itself.  
 
3. Metaphysical modal logic within mathematics 
 
How deep do the modal commitments of mathematics run? So far we have argued against 
views that posit an epistemic division of labor in which mathematics supplies the truths and 
philosophy supplies their necessity. We have argued that the necessity of all mathematical 
truths is provable within mathematics itself, by the standard of proof operative in mathematics. 
This still leaves room for a kind of epistemic division of labor: one might think that, while 
mathematics supplies both the truths and their necessity, it stops short of telling us anything 
further about necessity. In the new division of epistemic labor, it is up to philosophers to supply 
any further truths about the modal status of mathematical statements, such as that any 
mathematical statement that is necessarily true is necessarily necessarily true. According to this 
picture, to put it in a slogan, mathematics supplies both the truths and their necessity, and 
philosophy supplies the logic of their necessity. 
 In fact, it already follows from what has been said that this picture cannot be correct. If 
we are right, mathematical practice turns out to be highly opinionated about the application of 
principles of modal logic to mathematics. By replacing ‘A’ in (£) with ‘£A’ and with ‘¯A’ 
we get  
 




5: ⊢ ¯A ® £¯A. 
 
Classical Consequence, the Deduction Theorem, Modus Ponens, and Cut imply that ⊢ (¬A £® 
^) ® A,25 so, by Definition 1, 
 
T: ⊢ £A ® A. 
                                               
25 By Modus Ponens, ¬A £® ^, ¬A ⊢ ^. By the Deduction Theorem, ¬A £® ^, ⊢	¬A ® ^. By Classical 
Consequence and Cut, then, ¬A £® ^, ⊢	A, and by the Deduction Theorem, ⊢ (¬A £® ^) ®	A. 
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It should come as no surprise that the K axiom £(A ® B) ® (£A ® £B) is also provable in 
mathematics.26 Finally, provability in mathematics obeys the principle of Necessitation:  
 
If ⊢	A then ⊢	£A. 
 
After all, by Cut, whatever is provable from something provable is itself provable, and on the 
way to proving (£) we proved that A ⊢ £A. 
 The previous paragraph’s observations amount to just this:  
 
Every theorem of the modal system S5 that is expressible in the language of 
mathematics is provable in mathematics.27  
 
In effect, mathematics contains within itself the system S5. Since philosophical consensus 
holds that the logic of metaphysical modality is S5, this means that mathematics is at least as 
opinionated as philosophical consensus about the application of principles of modal logic to 
mathematics. Indeed, mathematics has locked on to the characteristic feature of metaphysical 
modality, which is the collapse of all iterated modalities: in S5, £A is equivalent to (£/¯)£A 
and ¯A is equivalent to (£/¯)¯A, where (£/¯) is any finite string of boxes and diamonds. 
From (£) and the above observations it follows that: 
 
 ⊢ A ® (£/¯)A. 
 
That is to say, it is provable in mathematics that every mathematical truth is necessarily 
necessarily true, necessarily possibly true, necessarily necessarily necessarily true, and so on 
for all finite sequences of ‘necessarily’s and ‘possibly’s. There is no epistemic division of labor 
even of the modest kind envisaged at the beginning of this section. 
 Might mathematics be more modally opinionated than philosophical consensus? Recall 
our key finding: 
 
(£) ⊢	A ® £A.  
 
The result of adding (£) to S5 is the modal system TRIV, in which all modal distinctions 
collapse: A is equivalent to (£/¯)A. At first this might look like bad news for our project, but 
it is actually the result we want. Recall that ‘⊢’ expresses provability in mathematics—by 
which we mean pure mathematics. G ⊢ A only if both A and all of the statements in G are pure 
mathematical statements. All modal distinctions do collapse for non-contingent statements, and 
all mathematical statements are non-contingent. Since philosophical consensus holds that all 
mathematical statements are non-contingent, mathematics is exactly as opinionated as 
philosophical consensus on the application of principles of modal logic to mathematics. How 
do we know that mathematics is exactly as opinionated and not more opinionated than 
philosophical consensus on this matter? Because every system of propositional modal logic 
stronger than TRIV is inconsistent,28 and mathematics is not inconsistent. 
                                               
26 By Classical Consequence, 
(A ® B) «	£(A ® B), A «	£A, B «	£B	⊢	£(A ® B) ® (£A ® £B) 
By T, (£), Classical Consequence, and Cut, we have ⊢	(A ® B) «	£(A ® B), A «	£A, B «	£B, so, by 
Cut, ⊢ £(A ® B) ® (£A ® £B). 
27 4 is a redundant step on the way to this conclusion. It is a theorem, not an axiom, of standard axiomatizations 
of S5. 
28 See Hughes and Cresswell (1996: 67). 
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 Here it may be worth re-emphasizing that ⊢ A does not imply that A is a logical truth.29 
That all TRIV theorems that are expressible in the language of mathematics are provable in 
mathematics does not indicate a mathematical commitment to TRIV as a logic, but only to the 
truth of those theorems. 
 
4. Objections and replies 
 
We shall now consider four objections to the foregoing. 
 
4.1. False counterpossibles? 
 
The first objection concerns Definition 1, which entails that all counterfactuals with 
metaphysically impossible antecedents—so-called counterpossibles—are true. 30  Many 
philosophers maintain that there are false counterpossibles,31 and they will accordingly reject 
Definition 1. Naturally they will also reject Williamson’s argument for the logical equivalence 
of the two sides of Definition 1. We ourselves think that there are good reasons to think that 
all counterpossibles are true.32 However, we need not assume either that principle or Definition 
1, which entails it, in order to establish (£). Our arguments for (£) relied on only one direction 
of the putative definitional equivalence of £A and (¬A £® ^): the entailment of £A by (¬A 
£® ^). And that direction is typically not questioned by philosophers who think there are false 
counterpossibles. Such philosophers typically reject NECESSITY while accepting POSSIBILITY, 
from which (¬A £® ^) ® £A is derivable in K.33 To make vivid why rejecting the entailment 
of £A by (¬A £® ^) would be a bad idea, consider the issue in terms of possible worlds 
semantics. In any standard ‘possible worlds’ semantics, the existence of a counterexample to 
the entailment of £A by ¬A £® ^ would require some impossible world to be closer to the 
                                               
29 Even on a neologicist approach, not everything provable in mathematics is a logical truth, since neologicists 
draw a distinction between logical and merely ‘analytic’ or ‘conceptual’ truth. 
30 Here is a proof. Suppose for a reductio that there is a false counterpossible. Then, for some A and B, £¬A is 
true and A £® B is false. Then, by Definition 1, and Classical Substitution, A £® ^ is true. But if A £® ^ is true 
then so is A £® C, for any C. (Everything is a truth-functional consequence of ^, and any truth-functional 
consequence of a proposition counterfactually implied by A is also counterfactually implied by A.) So, in 
particular, A £® B is true, contrary to hypothesis. 
31 E.g., Lowe (2012), Brogaard and Salerno (2013), and Berto et al. (2018). 
32 See Williamson (2010, 2016b, 2017b). 
33 See Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri (2017: §4) for review. One recent representative example is Berto et al.’s 
(2018) development a logic that allows counterpossibles to be false and validates POSSIBILITY. Similarly, Lowe 
(2012) maintains that there are false counterpossibles and accepts POSSIBILITY, with, however, less promising 
results (see Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri 2017: §4 for criticisms). 
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actual world than some possible world. But it’s extremely plausible that every possible world 
is closer to the actual world than any impossible world.34,35,36 
 
4.2. Are mathematical counterfactuals dispensable? 
 
The second objection proceeds from a thesis we’ll call DISPENSABILITY. DISPENSABILITY says 
that any counterfactuals in pure mathematics are dispensable in that they contribute nothing to 
the content of mathematics, in the sense that what mathematics contributes to our total body of 
knowledge it would still contribute (albeit perhaps in a less reader-friendly way) if its 
counterfactuals were replaced by indicative or (if these are different) material conditionals.37 
DISPENSABILITY is consistent with, and can be motivated by, a variety of views about the role 
of counterfactual conditionals in mathematics. For example, an advocate of DISPENSABILITY 
might think that there are, contrary to appearances, no counterfactuals in mathematical texts, 
and that the subjunctive conditional construction has a non-standard semantics in mathematical 
contexts. Or he might think that mathematicians are simply being careless when they use 
subjunctive conditionals, and that what they really mean to express by these conditionals, when 
push comes to shove, are the corresponding indicative or material conditionals. Or, rather more 
plausibly, she might concede that, as in the case of epistemic modals, there are good reasons 
for the occurrence of counterfactuals in mathematical texts, and that they are even 
indispensable for some (e.g., pragmatic) purposes, but, like epistemic modals, counterfactuals 
are nevertheless dispensable to what mathematics contributes to our knowledge. According to 
this perspective, we are making the same kind of mistake that would be made by someone who 
takes pure mathematics to be committed to various epistemic claims on account of the ubiquity 
of epistemic modals in mathematical texts. Clearly that would be a mistake: whatever role 
                                               
34 Clarke-Doane (2017) is a notable exception to the mainstream assumption that every possible world is closer 
to the actual world than any impossible world. (He thus, in effect, questions POSSIBILITY: Suppose A is 
possible and B is not, and that the closest A-world is an impossible world where A and B are true. Then, on the 
standard semantics, A £®  B is true but ¯A ® ¯B is not.) One of his main examples is ‘If Obama had been 
named ‘Alice’, then Obama would not have been female’. He thinks there are contexts in which this is false, 
even on the assumption that Obama is necessarily not female. If he is right in his judgment about this 
counterfactual, then it would seem that we need some impossible world to do the job of witnessing the falsity of 
the counterfactual at the relevant contexts, which on both the standard semantics (Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s) 
would require it to be closer to the actual world than the possible worlds in which Obama is not female. We 
think the example is not optimal because it is far from clear that Obama is necessarily non-female. 
Counterfactuals like ‘If ‘Boston’ had referred to Obama, he would not have been a city’ and ‘If ‘The Empire 
State Building’ had referred to Obama, then he would not have been a skyscraper’ seem like better test cases to 
us, and our judgment is that they are clearly true in every context. However, considerations of space prevent us 
from engaging in full with Clarke-Doane here. (See Nolan (1997) for further discussion.) 
35 A subtle complication arises when we retreat to versions of our arguments that do not rely on Definition 1, for 
then we can no longer assume that the language of mathematics can express the necessity of any mathematical 
statement: without Definition 1, we have no argument that £A is in the language of mathematics whenever A is. 
To derive (£) we must either consider a mathematical language enriched with £ or interpret ‘A1, …, An ⊢ B’ to 
mean something like ‘For some C1, …, Cn, each of C1, …, Cn is informally provable from A1, …, An and B is 
formally provable in K from C1, …, Cn and POSSIBILITY’. The second option strikes us as particularly attractive. 
It still delivers a result that displays the commitment of mathematics to the necessity of provable mathematical 
truths. Since K is sound and POSSIBILITY is valid, the result becomes that mathematics is committed to the 
necessity of its truths in the sense that, whatever mathematical statement A may be, A ® £A logically follows 
from statements provable in mathematics. 
36 Granted, certain proponents of the view that there are false counterpossibles may take the further radical step 
of rejecting COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION. We are not going to engage with such radicalism, except to 
remind the reader that we have argued that COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION is a part of the practice of 
mathematics, and so, if we are right, the radical step is tantamount to revisionism about that practice. 
37 Quine was a prominent defender of this view. In fact, he held the even stronger view that counterfactuals were 
dispensable to all of science. See, e.g., Quine (1994: 149-50). 
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epistemic modals play in those texts, mathematics is not in the business of teaching us anything 
about knowledge: the actual axioms, proofs, and results of mathematics, when strictly and 
literally stated, do not concern knowledge, no matter what epistemic language one finds in 
standard mathematical texts. Similarly, the objection goes, those same axioms, proofs, and 
results, strictly and literally stated, do not concern counterfactual matters,38 no matter what 
counterfactual-sounding language one finds in mathematical texts. 
 A great deal could be said about possible motivations for DISPENSABILITY (we find the 
hypotheses of carelessness and special semantics to be especially implausible39), but there is 
no need to engage with its motivations when we can attack DISPENSABILITY directly, and we 
will. 
 In fact, counterfactuals are absolutely indispensable to what mathematics contributes 
to our total body of knowledge—which is to say, DISPENSABILITY is false. Note first that 
myriad applications of mathematics to the hustle and bustle of both everyday life and 
engineering require our knowing that mathematical truths would remain true even if things had 
gone differently in various ways. For example, in justifying a particular engineering solution, 
one often appeals to mathematical truths in reasoning about how things would have gone if one 
had opted for an alternative solution. In doing so one assumes—and if one is successful, one 
knows—that those mathematical truths would have been true even if one had opted for the 
alternative solution. Note second that, as the queen of the sciences, mathematics is primed for 
application in any area of objective inquiry, whether it be the science of electromagnetism, the 
theory of rook and pawn endings, or natural language semantics. Each of these disciplines 
deploys its own counterfactuals, and in applying mathematics to them one must know that the 
truths of mathematics would remain true also under their counterfactual suppositions. Notably 
such counterfactual suppositions often include ones that are nomologically impossible and yet 
are not treated as ones from which anything whatsoever follows. For example, when doing 
physics, we are perfectly happy to hold the truths of mathematics fixed when suppositionally 
reasoning about the behavior of particles under various permutations of the standard model, 
and our comfort level does not at all diminish when reasoning about models that we take to be 
nomologically impossible. To get a good feel for the contrast between mathematics and physics 
here, consider the theory of Turing machines or the theory of infinite games. When one engages 
in counterfactual suppositional reasoning in these areas, one does not hold the laws of physics 
fixed under one’s suppositions—here it is simply irrelevant whether infinite tapes or eternal 
games of chess are physically possible—but one does hold the truths of mathematics fixed.40 
The success of our practice of applying mathematics to anything whatsoever requires that we 
know that mathematical truths would remain true under any counterfactual suppositions 
whatsoever41—which is to say, it requires that we know that mathematical truths would remain 
true no matter what, or, equivalently, that they are necessary truths. 
                                               
38 As in the case of knowledge, one might think that this claim is undermined by the existence of counterfactual 
logic as a bona fide area of mathematical inquiry, but, in any case, it would be hard to argue from mathematical 
commitment to some kind of counterfactual logic to the claims we wish to argue for. After all, our claims concern 
informal provability, and our premises include claims about counterfactuals that are not principles of any 
reasonable counterfactual logic. 
39 The short story is that the hypothesis of carelessness ascribes implausible deficits in semantic processing to 
sophisticated mathematicians, and the hypothesis of special semantics is supported by no linguistic data. And it 
is no more plausible to suggest that counterfactuals in mathematics are being used non-literally. 
40 Of course we could decide to not hold some particular mathematical facts fixed in some of our mathematical 
counterfactual reasoning, and plausibly we sometimes do when we are, e.g., trying to determine whether a 
certain axiom is needed for proving a certain theorem. But such contexts are special, and the unexpected uses of 
counterfactuals in them can be explained as applications of a general conditional heuristic: for more, see §4.4. 
41 This sentence contains our reply to Gideon Rosen’s (2002) parable of the two tribes who disagree about whether 
it is metaphysically contingent that there are numbers. Rosen finds it hard to tell which tribe is right. Our view is 
that the ‘modally deviant’ tribe (to use his term) would have a hard time applying mathematics as widely as we 
 16 
 
4.3. Are mathematical counterfactuals restricted? 
 
The third objection turns on the point that, for any restricted objective necessity £¢, one can 
define an associated ‘restricted counterfactual’ £® ¢ that obeys the principle 
 
£¢A « (¬A £® ¢^). 
 
Even granting that mathematics deploys counterfactual discourse, it may be suggested that the 
counterfactuals in play are restricted in some way, and consequently mathematics is not 
committed to the necessity simpliciter of mathematical truths, but only to their necessity in a 
correspondingly restricted sense. By analogy, suppose you are playing craps and you throw a 
red die and a green die, and the first comes up six and the second three. It is then natural for 
you to say: ‘If the green die had come up six, I would have had boxcars’. It’s pretty clear here 
that you are somehow restricting the domain of the possibilities your counterfactual generalizes 
over to ones in which the red die comes up six. (Without this restriction, what you say may 
well be false: perhaps, for all you know, if the green die had come up six, it would have done 
so by bumping into the red die and causing it to come up one.) One might suspect that 
mathematical counterfactuals involve a similar implicit restriction to (e.g.) possibilities in 
which the actual truths of mathematics are true. And if that is right, then mathematical 
counterfactuals be unimpugned by possibilities in which the truths of mathematics are different 
from what they actually are, and facts like (£) would not, after all, manifest a mathematical 
commitment to the necessity of mathematical truths, but only to their truth. (One can imagine 
various other versions of the view that mathematical counterfactuals are restricted; any of them 
would undermine our argument. We only offer this one as an illustration.) 
 One important concern about this proposal is that employing systematically restricted 
counterfactuals can severely hinder inquiry. To take an extreme example, consider a 
community that lives in a world in which, as a matter of dumb luck, no explosions ever occur, 
even though, on many occasions, an explosion could easily have occurred. (For example, on 
many occasions, matches get lit near barrels of gunpowder but, by sheer luck, the gunpowder 
never ignites.) Suppose that the community systematically restricts its counterfactuals to 
explosion-free worlds. Thus (roughly) a counterfactual asserted by a member of this 
community is true just in case its consequent is true in all of the explosion-free worlds closest 
to their world in which its antecedent is true. Owing to this quirky restriction, a community 
member speaks the truth in asserting: ‘If I were to set fire to that gunpowder, nothing bad would 
happen’. This way of using counterfactuals is hardly conducive to survival, as it is insensitive 
to all sorts of clear and present dangers. It achieves truth at the cost of blindness to danger. 
Now suppose that we live in a world in which mathematics is contingent, but we systematically 
restrict our counterfactuals to worlds in which the actual truths of mathematics hold. Even if 
this doesn’t make us quite as reckless with gunpowder as the imagined community, certain 
other kinds of blindness to danger may threaten. For example, suppose that God’s decision to 
create numbers is contingent on the amount of evil in the world, and suppose that we only just 
came in under the bar required for numerical creation. Thanks to the way our counterfactuals 
are restricted, a member of our community speaks the truth in asserting: ‘If I had murdered 
someone, there would have still been numbers’ (since, in the restricted domain, the closest 
worlds where the speaker murders someone are ones where there is a compensating absence of 
evil). But from God’s point of view this restriction makes us blind to an important structural 
                                               
do. And if they did apply mathematics as widely, they would be in the awkward position of not knowing that 
various of their applications were correct.  
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feature of reality, namely that the existence of numbers (unrestrictedly) counterfactually 
depends on the amount of evil in the world.  
 We find it completely implausible that, when we routinely and successfully deploy 
mathematics in everyday life, engineering, and physics and other fields of objective inquiry, 
we are hampered by a blindness of the sort just described. By our lights, by far the most natural 
explanation of the success of applied mathematics in promoting engineering and objective 
inquiry is that the counterfactuals of pure mathematics are completely unrestricted.  
Of course this is not the only conceivable explanation. There are various theoretical 
posits that would allow the various applications of mathematics to proceed profitably and 
smoothly even if mathematical counterfactuals were restricted.42 Perhaps least implausibly, 
one might posit that, while mathematics is contingent, the worlds in which different 
mathematical truths obtain are so distant (in the counterfactual sense of ‘distant’) from the 
actual world that restricting our mathematical counterfactuals to worlds in which the actual 
mathematical truths obtain doesn’t blind us to any possibilities that matter in everyday life, 
engineering, physics, theology, and so on.43 
We agree that it is natural enough for a believer in the contingency of mathematics to 
conjecture that the worlds where mathematics is different are very distant from the actual 
world. However, there is a further problem. It is still poor form to restrict one’s 
counterfactuals so that in one’s chosen theoretical language that conjecture cannot be tested 
against reality. By analogy, it is a plausible conjecture that all humans are under ten feet tall. 
Suppose now that we adopt a language in which we define ‘human’ so as to ensure that 
nothing at least ten feet tall belongs to its extension. In the new language it simply doesn’t 
matter whether the conjecture expressed in the old language is true: in the new language ‘All 
humans are under ten feet tall’ comes out true regardless of the truth value of the hypothesis 
it expressed in the old language. (Similarly, ‘All humans are under ten feet tall’ will get 
positive epistemic status—knowledge, justification, and what have you—on the cheap. 
Suppose that the conjecture expressed by the sentence in the old language was true but not 
known. In the new language the sentence expresses a known fact, and the fact that the 
original conjecture was not known is now hidden from view.) It is not a good idea to 
gerrymander one’s language in this way. Other things being equal, it is better to stick with the 
old language and let the conjecture actually expressed by ‘All humans are under ten feet tall’ 
run the gauntlet of empirical fortune. 
Similar remarks hold for the counterfactual case. Consider the counterfactual  
 
(Chippy)  If we had bought fish and chips, the axiom of choice would have still been true.  
 
Consider now the conjecture that mathematics is contingent but mathematics is different only 
in very distant worlds. Assuming that conjecture and the truth of the axiom of choice, 
(Chippy) will be true—mathematical truths are not counterfactually dependent on what we 
choose to have for dinner. Still, it would be poor form to restrict our counterfactuals in such a 
                                               
42 We note that there is a minority of philosophers who think that all objective modal operators are inevitably 
restricted. These are philosophers who think, for example, that for any objective necessity there is an even 
broader one (see, notably, Clarke-Doane 2017). A potentially useful analogy is with those who disavow 
absolutely unrestricted quantification and argue that, for any universal quantifier, there is an even broader 
universal quantifier. The analogy is particularly apt if we think of objective modal operators as quantifiers over 
domains of worlds. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with modal applications of the idea of 
indefinite extensibility, but see Williamson (2003) for an overview of the problems with the view as applied to 
standard quantifiers. The idea that metaphysical necessity is indefinitely extensible does not by itself entail the 
contingency of mathematics (mathematical truths might remain true no matter how far we broaden our domain 
of worlds), but Clarke-Doane’s development of it is favorable to a contingentist approach to mathematics. 
43 See Clarke-Doane (2017) for a discussion of some of the relevant issues.  
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way that (Chippy) cannot be tested against reality, and in particular in such a way that the 
truth of (Chippy) is independent of the truth of the conjecture expressed in the original 
language. (Similarly, such a restriction ensures that (Chippy) is known—so long as we are 
appropriately sensitive to the restriction in play—whether or not the hypothesis (Chippy) 
expressed in the original language was known.) Once again, it is best to let the counterfactual 
run the gauntlet of empirical fortune.  
One possible reaction to this is to opt for a divided treatment of pure and applied 
mathematics. In particular, one might opt for an approach according to which the 
counterfactuals of pure mathematics are de jure restricted to worlds in which the actual 
mathematical truths are true while the counterfactuals of applied mathematics are 
unrestricted. Applied mathematics would then run the gauntlet of empirical fortune in the 
required way. But the problem with the divided treatment of counterfactuals is that it makes a 
mystery of how knowledge of pure mathematics can readily be parlayed into knowledge of 
applied mathematics. To illustrate, here is a useful counterfactual of pure mathematics:  
 
If it were the case that, for some plane separated into contiguous regions, there is no 
function f from the regions to a four-membered pure set such that, for all pairs x, y of 
contiguous regions f(x) ≠ f(y), then it would be the case that ^.  
 
(More briefly put: if the four color theorem were false then it would be the case that ^.) On 
the proposal under consideration, the counterfactual is true whether or not mathematics varies 
at close worlds. But then, on that proposal, the inference from that counterfactual to: ‘If we 
were to draw a map, then the four color theorem would be true’ would be invalid, as would 
various other routine inferences from counterfactuals of pure mathematics to counterfactuals 
of applied mathematics. Taken at face value, such inferences would equivocate on the 
counterfactual, which occurs restricted in the premises and unrestricted in the conclusion. In 
order to account for our ability to extend our knowledge by such inferences, we would have 
to reconstruct them as enthymemes, and it is unclear what the missing premises would be. 
Somehow, for example, we would need to reconstruct the inference from a pure and 
restricted counterfactual ¬A £® ¢ ^ to an applied and unrestricted counterfactual B £®  A as 
valid when the closest worlds where B is true are not very distant and as invalid when they 
are. While this view may not be completely disastrous, it does seem to be out of step with 
how we naturally think of the relationship between pure and applied mathematics. Inferences 
from pure to applied mathematics appear to be much more straightforward than they are on 
the view under consideration. On the view that the counterfactuals of pure mathematics are 
completely unrestricted, those inferences are very straightforward. On the split treatment 
under consideration, they are very far from straightforward. We submit that this counts 
substantially in favor of our approach. 
In summary, there are two problems for restricting counterfactuals. One is that it 
potentially blinds us to possibilities that matter for various applications of mathematics. This 
worry can be dealt with by claiming that the worlds where mathematics is different are very 
distant. But there is a second worry, one that applies whether or not one thinks such worlds 
are distant: it makes one’s counterfactuals strangely independent of the truth of such 
conjectures as that variant mathematical worlds are distant, since the distance of such worlds 
has no bearing on the truth conditions of counterfactuals in the restricted language. One 
might try to address this concern by a mixed strategy that treats only pure mathematics as 
relevantly restricted. But this considerably complicates the relationship between pure and 




4.4. Denials of counterfactuals 
 
The fourth objection needs especially careful attention.44 It is time to admit that the use of 
counterfactuals in mathematics is not quite as uniform as we have been pretending. As a point 
of comparison, it may be helpful to first get clear on which patterns of assertions and denials 
of counterfactuals we would expect to find in a community of mathematicians—call them the 
Boxers—that explicitly treats it as common ground that all mathematical truths are necessary 
and explicitly adopts and reasons in accordance with a logic that classifies all counterpossibles 
as true. We will then see that actual mathematicians’ patterns of assertions and denials of 
counterfactuals differ somewhat from the patterns we should expect to find in the Boxer 
community.  
Let us contrast two kinds of conversational contexts for the use of mathematical 
counterfactuals. In a consensus context the relevant axioms are taken for granted, it is common 
ground that they are being taken for granted, and no one is interested in challenging any of the 
axioms or in exploring the ramifications of giving up some but not all of the axioms, as a 
means, for example, for determining how strong a system of axioms one needs to prove a 
certain theorem. A non-consensus context is a context that is not a consensus context. In a non-
consensus context one is not entitled to assume that all of the axioms are true and hence also 
not entitled to assume that they are provable, since provability entails truth.45 
Consider a counterfactual A £® B in a consensus context in which A is known to be 
disprovable from the axioms. In such a context, a Boxer would assert A £® B only for 
pedagogical purposes, so that the counterfactual either is or is asserted as step towards 
establishing A £® ^ (or another counterfactual with an absurd consequent), and thus ¬A. For 
example, if A is the claim that there is a largest prime number, the point, if any, of a Boxer’s 
assertion of A £® B will be to contribute to an explanation of why there is no largest prime 
number. In developing the counterfactual supposition that there is a largest prime number, a 
Boxer, believing that they hold under any counterfactual supposition whatever, never suspends 
judgment in the Peano axioms (from which the fundamental theorem of arithmetic is provable) 
but makes full use of them in order to extract absurd conclusions. A Boxer would not be 
tempted by the following line of thought. 
 
‘Granted, the Peano axioms are all true, but perhaps they are only contingently true, 
and perhaps, if there had been a largest prime, only some of the Peano axioms would 
have been true, and the fundamental theorem of arithmetic would have been false.’ 
 
Now consider a counterfactual ¬A £® ^ in a non-consensus context in which A is one 
of the contested axioms—the axiom of choice (AC), for example. In such a context, a Boxer 
would refrain from asserting ¬A £® ^, even if he accepted A (and therefore, being a Boxer, 
accepted ¬A £® ^ too). But the Boxer would not be equally reluctant to assert every 
counterfactual whose antecedent is ¬A. After all, ¬A, together with the axioms on which there 
is a consensus, can still be counterfactually developed to yield a variety of conclusions. For 
example, the Boxer might still assert: 
                                               
44 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this objection to our attention. 
45 The referee suggests that, as a general rule, we hold the axioms fixed when we counterfactually suppose the 
negation of a theorem. We don’t think this is a general rule; rather, whether we hold axioms fixed when we 
counterfactually suppose the negation of a theorem depends on whether we are in a consensus or a non-consensus 
context. For example, in a consensus context, a counterfactual that begins ‘If all sets of reals were Lebesgue 
measurable, …’ would naturally occur at the beginning of a reductio in which one holds AC fixed in order to 
arrive at a contradiction. On the other hand, in a non-consensus context the same antecedent might figure in a 
counterfactual along the lines: ‘If all sets of reals were Lebesgue measurable, then AC would be false’. 
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(TB)  If AC were false, then the Tarski-Banach theorem would not be provable from the 
truths of set theory. 
 
Similar points hold for other antecedents that the Boxers know to be false on the supposition 
of the falsehood of AC. For example, a Boxer who suspects that AC is true and knows that, if 
AC is true, then it is not the case that all sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, will also suspect 
that ‘If all sets of reals were Lebesgue measurable, then ^’ is true, but such a Boxer will not 
assert this counterfactual because AC is not part of the common ground. However, the Boxer 
would not be at all reluctant to assert:  
 
(LM) If all sets of reals were Lebesgue measurable, then AC would be false (and we would 
be living in a Solovay model).46  
 
The Boxer can reason as follows: ‘There are two subcases. If AC is true (and thus necessarily 
true), then (LM) has an impossible antecedent and gets to be true on the cheap. And if AC is 
false, then (LM)’s antecedent is possible and indeed the closest world where its antecedent is 
true is the actual world, where its consequent is true. Either way, (LM) is true.’ The fact that, 
for all the Boxer knows, the counterfactuals 
 
(TB¢)  If AC were false, then the Tarski-Banach theorem would be provable from the truths 
of set theory 
 
(LM¢) If all sets of reals were Lebesgue measurable, then AC would be true 
 
are also true does not in any way hinder the assertion of (TB) or (LM). Now, of course, if the 
Boxer accepts AC, he will also accept the (TB¢) and (LM¢), but, this being a non-consensus 
context, he will not assert either (TB¢) or (LM¢). What the boxer won’t do is deny any 
mathematical counterfactual whose antecedent is, for all he knows, false. This is because, any 
such counterfactual, for all he knows, has an impossible antecedent and is vacuously true. 
Let us now turn to actual mathematicians. As we see it, they are a pretty good 
approximation to the Boxers, but with one significant exception. When it comes to consensus 
contexts, it seems to us that actual mathematicians proceed just like the Boxers in their use of 
counterfactuals. For example, they manifest little temptation to reject claims like ‘If there were 
a largest prime, then the successor of the product of all primes would be both prime and 
composite’—a temptation that one would have if one tacitly regarded the truths of number 
theory as contingent. Like the Boxers, in consensus contexts they only assert counterfactuals 
that begin ‘If there were a largest prime…’ for pedagogical purposes. In non-consensus 
contexts, however, we see a departure from the Boxer practice. The departure concerns neither 
those counterfactuals that the Boxers would assert nor those that they would not assert. In non-
consensus contexts mathematicians will, for example, assert (TB) and (LM), just like the 
Boxers, and will refrain from asserting (TB¢) and (LM¢), just like the Boxers. But unlike the 
Boxers, mathematicians will tend to deny both (TB¢) and (LM¢) in non-consensus contexts.47 
This aspect of mathematical practice may lend significant encouragement to those, like Clarke-
                                               
46 Thanks to the referee for this example. 
47 Our evidence for this comes from conversations with mathematicians. We have not been able to find any 
instances of negated or denied counterfactuals in mathematics texts. (In this connection, it’s worth noting that 
none of the examples of negated mathematical counterfactuals in Jenny (2016) are drawn from the writing of 
actual mathematicians.) What goes on, it seems, is that when mathematicians find themselves denying a 
counterfactual, they simply refrain from using it in articles or textbooks. 
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Doane (2017), who deny the necessity of mathematics. After all, at least if one assumes 
orthodoxy about counterfactuals, it is not immediately clear how to make sense of the practice 
of denying counterfactuals like (TB¢) and (LM¢) except by attributing to mathematicians—at 
least in the contexts in which they do deny them—a tacit commitment to the contingency of 
some mathematical truths. Relatedly, such denials would also seem to signal ambivalence 
about COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION. After all, if, for all one knows, AC is true, then, by 
COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION, for all one knows, ¬AC £®  (AC Ù ¬AC) is true. And if 
¬AC £®  (AC Ù ¬AC) is true for all one knows, one has no business denying anything of the 
form ¬AC £® A. (Here we are assuming the standard principle Lewis (1973) calls ‘deduction 
within conditionals’, according to which A £® B entails A £® C whenever B entails C—or, 
in other words, that the counterfactual consequences of a statement are closed under logical 
consequence.) 
There is thus a prima facie tension within mathematical practice. On the one hand, it is 
hard to make sense of the practice of counterfactual reductio except by attributing to 
mathematicians a tacit commitment both to the necessity of all mathematical truths and a logic 
according to which all counterpossibles are true. These commitments would also make good 
sense of assertions of counterfactuals concerning contested axioms. On the other hand, the 
practice of denying counterfactuals like (TB¢) and (LM¢) seems contrary to those commitments. 
As a prelude to our own account of this apparent tension, it bears emphasis that the same 
tension is likely to be found in the use of counterfactuals by classical logicians. Their use of 
counterfactual reductio arguments and the counterfactuals they affirm regarding the 
consequences of alternative logics seem to be best explained by a tacit commitment both to the 
necessity of all logical truths and to a logic according to which all counterpossibles are true. 
On the other hand, it’s pretty clear that classical logicians will also tend to deny various 
counterfactuals concerning alternative logics. For example, there would be nothing 
extraordinary about a classical logician affirming ‘If the paraconsistent LP truth tables were 
correct and there was a true contradiction, then modus ponens would be invalid’ while denying 
‘If the LP truth tables were correct and there was a true contradiction, then everything would 
be true’. Actual classical logicians thus seem to depart from classical Boxer logicians in just 
the same way in which actual mathematicians depart from the Boxers. It seems immensely 
plausible that the correct story about the apparent tension in each case should be the same. Let 
us now consider three stories: two according to which the tension in each case is merely 
apparent, and one—which we favor—according to which the tension is real.  
Here is the first story: Mathematics is contingent. The tension is merely apparent, 
because mathematical proofs by counterfactual reductio use restricted counterfactuals, while 
counterfactuals that explore the consequences of alternative mathematical axioms are either 
unrestricted or in any case less restricted than the ones used in reductios. It should be clear why 
we are less than happy with this diagnosis. We won’t repeat our arguments from §4.3 against 
views that posit contextual restrictions in mathematical counterfactuals. Furthermore, telling 
the same story about the apparent tension in classical logicians’ use of counterfactuals would 
involve adopting the extremely radical view that logic is contingent. 
Here is the second story: All counterpossibles are true. The tension is merely apparent 
because mathematical counterfactuals used in reductios are restricted to the possible worlds, 
whereas counterfactuals that explore the consequences of alternative axioms generalize over 
larger domains of worlds that include some impossible worlds. This proposal, too, we find 
objectionable for the reasons given in §4.3 and because telling the same story about the 
apparent tension in classical logicians’ use of counterfactuals would involve adopting an 
extremely radical view—in this case about the logic of counterfactuals. In telling the same 
story about logic, we must give up the view that all counterlogicals (counterfactuals whose 
antecedents are logical falsehoods) are true, and this, in turn, would require giving up vast 
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swathes of the standard logic of counterfactuals. Most obviously, it would require giving up 
the principle that the counterfactual consequences of a proposition are closed under logical 
consequence (A £® B implies A £® C when B implies C), as well as, provided that reflexivity 
(A £® A) is not given up, the principle that logical entailment is at least as strong as 
counterfactual entailment (A £® B, when A implies B). Furthermore, if there are impossible 
worlds in which a conjunction fails to be true even though each conjunct is true, the standard 
principle of finite agglomeration ((A £® B) Ù (A £® C)) ® (A £® (B Ù C))) will also have 
to go. Such logical revisionism should not be taken lightly.  
Here is a third story, which we think is correct: mathematics and logic are both 
necessary, and the tension is real: mathematicians and classical logicians are making a kind of 
mistake that is ubiquitous in both ordinary and scientific counterfactual thinking when they 
deny counterpossibles. One very basic heuristic that we apply to both indicative and 
counterfactual conditionals is: if you accept A Þ ¬B, reject A Þ B (where Þ is either kind of 
conditional). This heuristic serves us well much of the time, but it also trips us up in many 
cases. Timothy Williamson (2018) has suggested a highly plausible explanation of this 
heuristic, as subsumed under a more general heuristic: our default way of deciding whether to 
take an attitude X towards a conditional A Þ B is to check whether, under the supposition of 
A, we are led to take X towards B; if we are, then we take X towards A Þ B. (The rules for 
developing a supposition are, of course, different for indicative and counterfactual conditionals, 
but the abstract heuristic is the same in each case.) That is, if one, under the counterfactual 
supposition that A, affirms/denies/adopts a credence of r towards/… B, then by default one will 
affirm/deny/adopt a credence of r towards/… A Þ B. Thus, for example, if, having 
counterfactually supposed that one tosses a coin, one is 50% confident of tails eventuating, one 
will tend to be 50% confident that, if one were to toss a coin, it would land tails. Or if, having 
counterfactually supposed that one lives in a dialetheic world, one denies that every proposition 
is true, one will tend to deny: ‘If we lived in a dialetheic world, then every proposition would 
be true’. It’s a matter of debate in exactly which cases this general conditional heuristic gets us 
into trouble, but there is no question that in some cases it does. A well-known case involves 
probabilities: as Lewis (1976) observed, there is no conditional Þ for which P(A Þ B) = 
P(B|A). But even when we take on board this observation, we tend to continue to deploy the 
heuristic in cases where it doesn’t obviously get us into trouble. Yet it may very well be that in 
many of those cases too the heuristic is leading us into error. The situation is quite similar when 
it comes to applying the heuristic to yield denials of counterfactuals. In some cases this will 
obviously lead to trouble. Pretty much everyone accepts reflexivity. So, pretty much anyone, 
having accepted ¬A under the supposition of A in performing a counterfactual reductio, will 
resist applying the heuristic, since that would yield a denial of A £® A.48 But, as in other cases, 
people in all walks of life tend to continue to use the heuristic to arrive at denials of 
counterfactuals in cases where it doesn’t lead to any obvious error. Of course, by our lights, 
many such applications do lead to error. It is clear that, if the standard view that all 
counterpossibles are true is correct, then the heuristic seriously misfires when applied to them. 
                                               
48 In fact, as Timothy Williamson points out in his comments, the heuristic gets in trouble with reflexivity even 
when applied to acceptance: suppose that you accept the following instance of reflexivity. 
(A Ù ¬A) £®  (A Ù ¬A) 
And suppose that then, applying the converse of finite agglomeration (when a conjunction follows 
counterfactually something, so does each conjunct), you accept 
((A Ù ¬A) £®  A) Ù ((A Ù ¬A) £®  ¬A). 
Given that you accept the second conjunct, the heuristic directs you to accept the negation of the first conjunct, 
and thus to accept an inconsistent pair of claims. 
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After all, when applied to the attitude of accepting the negation, the heuristic directs us to 
accept the negation of A £® B when we accept the negation of B under the supposition of A. 
So, when A is impossible and we correctly accept ¬B under the supposition of A, the heuristic 
directs us to accept ¬(A £® B), which is false if all counterpossibles are true. Since, according 
to the story we prefer, all counterpossibles are true, the general conditional heuristic, together 
with the plausible assumption that mathematicians and classical logicians are not relevantly 
more immune than philosophers or linguists to being led to error by that heuristic, yields a 
satisfying explanation of the genuine tension in the use of counterfactuals by both 
mathematicians and classical logicians.  
It bears emphasis that, if our picture is correct, then these mistakes of counterfactual 
reasoning are confined to a fairly small part of the practice of counterfactual reasoning by 
mathematicians and classical logicians. (Our sense of confinement is reinforced further by the 
fact that these mistakes don’t even seem to make it into published work by mathematicians: 
see note 47.) The widespread practices of counterfactual reductio and of making (and refraining 
from making) positive counterfactual claims about contested mathematical axioms or 
alternative logics are completely unproblematic from our point of view. There is no need for 
any kind of special pleading regarding contextual restrictions or departures from entrenched 
principles of counterfactual logic to account for these. On the other hand, in the one area where 
we do find mistakes, they are explained by a familiar heuristic of counterfactual reasoning that 
is widely known to produce mistakes in other areas and that clearly does produce mistakes 
when applied to counterpossibles, on the standard assumption that all counterpossibles are true. 
In our view, this picture of the use of counterfactuals in mathematics and logic enjoys 
extremely powerful abductive support. We concede that our picture is not the only game in 
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